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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
          Studying the Great Inflation in the 1960s and the 1970s seems still very important even in 
the  current  low-inflation  environment  because  such  a  grim  economic  situation  should  be 
avoided forever. To take proper measures to avoid a resurgence of chronic high inflation in 
future, the true cause of the Great Inflation should be identified. There are many explanations 
for the cause of the Great Inflation, and most of them seem to be classified into the following 
several views.   
 
(i) The bad luck view 
This view attributes the cause of the Great Inflation to exogenous large shocks that were 
not related to policies.
1  However, the chronic high inflation in the 1960s and the 1970s was so 
exceptional and persisted so long that it is hard to identify exogenous large shocks that were 
reconciled with the exceptional movement of inflation at the time. Some argue that two oil price 
shocks in the 1970s triggered the Great Inflation. However, others offer a counterargument that, 
although the oil price shocks may have played important roles to some extent, they alone can 
not fully explain the Great Inflation because it was already underway in the late 1960s.
2   
(ii) The time inconsistency view 
          Kydland  and  Prescott  (1977)  and  Barro  and  Gordon  (1983)  argue  that  the  lack  of 
commitment is the main cause of the Great Inflation. This view is recently emphasized again by 
Chari, Christiano and Eichenbaum (1998).
3  They contend that if monetary policy makers are 
unable to fully commit to policies, they find themselves in a sub-optimal equilibrium. It implies 
a  possibility  that  the  Great  Inflation  was  caused  by  the  lack  of  commitment.  A  typical 
explanation  based  on  this  view  is  that,  as  post-World  War  II  baby  boomers  entered  the 
                                                           
1  See e.g. Blinder (1982). 
2  See e.g. Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) and Taylor (2002). 
3  See also Christiano and Gust (2000).   3 
workforce, the natural rate of unemployment rose in the 1960s and the 1970s and declined in the 
1980s, and thus if the monetary policy makers were not able to fully commit their policies, 
inflation rose in the 1960s and the 1970s and declined in the 1980s. A problem of this view is 
that  this  view  needs  a  series  of  negative  and  persistent  supply-side  shocks  that  worked  to 
increase the  natural rate  of  unemployment to explain  the  Great  Inflation. Hence,  as  Ireland 
(1999) and Taylor (2002) argue, it is hard to explain the Great Inflation in Europe by the same 
mechanism as the U.S. because the demographic change in Europe was different from that in 
the U.S. and the movement of the natural rate of unemployment differed between them.
4  In 
addition, it is difficult to explain the sharp decline of inflation in the 1980s by a demographic 
change that usually proceeds gradually. Another difficulty with this view is that it predicts that 
unemployment leads inflation but unemployment usually lags inflation and thus this view is 
clearly at odds with the data. Finally, this view contends that the monetary policy makers in 
those days were insincere for a long period of time because they did not commit their policies. 
They may have been actually insincere but many will doubt whether they were really insincere 
for a long period of time because they were the best and brightest people in those days.   
(iii) The policy mistakes views 
          This view stresses that the monetary policy makers at the time were not as good as the 
ones after the 1980s. There are two versions of the policy mistakes view. 
    a) The weak response view 
          It is argued by this view that the monetary policy makers in the 1960s and the 1970s were 
less responsive to inflationary pressures and it is the main cause of the Great Inflation. A typical 
model of this view is the model in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000). They argue that the model 
with  a  forward-looking  Phillips  curve  predicts  that  the  weak  response  of  monetary  policy 
makers  to  inflationary  pressures  generates  excessive  volatilities  of  inflation  and  thus  this 
mechanism has a possibility to have generated the Great Inflation. However, Christiano and 
                                                           
4  See e.g. Taylor (2002).   4 
Gust (2000) criticize Clarida et al. (2000) for inconsistence with the observed stagflation of the 
time because the model in Clarida et al. (2000) predicts that the rise in inflation triggered by a 
bad supply shock is associated with a sustained rise in employment. Another weak point of the 
model  of  Clarida  et  al.  (2000)  is  that  it  depends  on  forward-looking  Phillips  curves  but 
forward-looking Phillips curves are criticized for not being able to explain the persistent nature 
of inflation.
5  Furthermore, like the time inconsistency view, this view has a weak point that it 
needs to contend the monetary policy makers’ insincerity or foolishness because they continued 
to take clearly inferior policies.
6 
    b) The misperception view 
          Orphanides (2002, 2003) argues another type of policy mistakes. He contends that the 
potential GDP was overestimated and correspondingly the full-employment unemployment rate 
was  underestimated  and  thereby  monetary  policy  makers  wrongly  took  over-expansionary 
monetary policies. However, Taylor (2002) argues that the potential GDP series that Orphanides 
(2002, 2003) uses was recognized at the time by the monetary policy makers to be flawed and 
thus this view exaggerates the size of the policy error. Furthermore, models based on this view 
usually show that the contribution of the overestimate of potential GDP to the Great Inflation is 
not high and thus an additional mechanism is needed to fully explain the Great Inflation.
7  In 
addition, this view has the same weak point as other views that it needs to contend that the 
monetary policy makers in those days were foolish for a long period of time.   
 
          The above views, at first glance, appear very different each other, but they have some 
common  features.  First,  except  the  bad luck view,  they commonly argue  that  the  monetary 
                                                           
5  See e.g. Mankiw (2001) and Holden and Driscoll (2003). 
6  Clarida et al. (2000) admit that their paper does not answer one important question: why is it that during 
the pre-1979 period the Federal Reserve followed a rule that was clearly inferior? 
7  See Orphanides and Williams (2003).   5 
policy makers in the 1960s and 1970s continued to be insincere or foolish for a long period of 
time. However, a simple question may be raised: were they actually insincere or foolish for a 
long period of time? They may actually have been so, but they were the best and brightest 
people at the time. Many therefore will not be convinced completely by the explanations that 
assume merely their insincerity or foolishness unless the reason why they continued to take such 
insincere or foolish policies is explained. 
          Particularly, there is a serious question why the monetary policy makers in the 1970s set 
high target rates of inflation. Clarida et al. (2000), Favero and Rovelli (2001) and Dennis (2001) 
conclude that the target rate of inflation in the pre-Volker era was much higher than that in the 
Volker-Greenspan era. Setting a high inflation target is completely different from making other 
policy  mistakes.  It  implies  that  monetary  policy  makers  do  not  wish  low  inflation  and 
intentionally pursue high inflation. It looks like a kind of crime. Any of the above views seems 
unable to offer a reasonable explanation other than arguing that the monetary policy makers 
deliberately committed a crime of high inflation. Nevertheless, it is not an easily acceptable 
argument. Probably there are some unavoidable reasons that are not explained well by the above 
views, by which the monetary policy makers were forced to raise the target rate of inflation 
unwillingly. 
          The second common feature of the above views is that, except the misperception view, 
they need  exceptionally large or successive negative supply  shocks. It is a serious problem 
because the Great Inflation was not limited in the U.S. but observed simultaneously in most 
industrialized countries. Thereby, those views need internationally common exceptionally large 
or successive negative supply shocks to explain the international aspect of the Great Inflation. 
However, a simple question may be raised again: what were actually these shocks? The oil price 
shocks in the 1970s do not seem to be such shocks because the Great Inflation was already 
underway in the mid 1960s. As was argued about shocks that the time inconsistency view needs, 
demographic changes were different across countries. It seems hard to identify these shocks.   6 
Hence those views have a serious weak point that they can not explain the international aspect 
of the Great Inflation. 
          The paper explores a different possibility of explanation for the Great Inflation to answer 
these questions. Unlike the aforementioned views, the paper does not assume an exceptional 
situation a priori. Instead, the paper explicitly separates the roles of a government and monetary 
policy makers and constructs a model that explicitly incorporates the preference of government, 
and analyzes the process of decision makings through interactions between them during the 
Great Inflation. The model indicates that inflation can accelerate even if an exceptional situation 
is not assumed. Unlike conventional models in which there is no possibility of the acceleration 
of inflation for any target rate of inflation unless an exceptional situation is assumed, there is a 
possibility that inflation accelerates for a range of inflation target, i.e. inflation can accelerate 
even if inflation target is low. This possibility is the most important finding in the paper and 
plays the key role in the explanation for the cause of the Great Inflation. Through the analyses 
of  this  acceleration  mechanism  of  inflation,  it  is  argued  that  the  Great  Inflation  was  a 
consequence  of  policy  errors  that  were  made  in  the  process  of  interaction  between  the 
governments and the monetary policy makers.   
          The paper is organized as follows. In section II, a conventional discrete-time model with a 
backward-looking Phillips curve is constructed and the preference of government is explicitly 
added to the model. In section III, the condition for the acceleration of inflation is examined by 
the model. It is shown that inflation accelerates despite a low inflation target. In section IV, the 
cause of the Great Inflation is examined by the model. The model indicates that (i) the monetary 
policy makers initially made an honest mistake to set a slightly higher inflation target, (ii) they 
were forced to raise inflation target unwillingly, and (iii) the governments were made hesitant to 
drastically change policies. In section V, it is argued that the explanation has three appealing 
features. Finally some concluding remarks are offered in section VI. 
   7 
II. THE MODEL 
 
1. A conventional model 
          To begin with, a conventional discrete-time model is constructed. This model is based on 
a backward-looking Phillips curve type model examined in Svensson (2003). It consists of an 
aggregate supply function, an aggregate demand function and a Taylor type instrument rule for 
monetary policy makers. 
- The aggregate supply function (Phillips curve): 
(1)  1 1 1 + + + + + + = t t z t x t t ε z α x α π π , 
- The aggregate demand function: 
(2)  ( ) 1 1 1 + + + + − − + = t t r t z t x t η r r β z β x β x , 
- The Taylor type instrument rule for monetary policy makers: 
(3)  ( ) t x
*
t π t x γ π π γ γ i + − + = , 
where πt is the rate of inflation, xt is the output gap, zt is a column vector of exogenous variables, 
rt is the short real interest rate,  r is the average short real interest rate, it is the short nominal 
interest rate, π* is the target rate of inflation, αx, αz, βx, βr,γ , γπ and γx are constant coefficients, 
αz and βz are row vectors of constant coefficients, εt and ηt are i.i.d. shocks with zero mean, and 
0 0 = ε   and  0 0 = η . Here,  r π γ
* + =   as is usually assumed and the short real interest rate is 
defined as follows;   
(4)  |t t t t π i r 1 + − ≡ , 
where  |t t π 1 +   means the rate of inflation in period t + 1 expected in period t , and it is assumed 
that  r r t s t = + |   for any s (s = 1,2,3,…). 
 
2. An extended model that explicitly incorporates the preference of government 
          An  essential  difference  between  government  and  monetary  policy  makers  is  that  a   8 
government  has  political  objectives  while  monetary  policy  makers  basically  have  only 
economic objectives. To construct a model that explicitly separates the roles of government and 
monetary policy makers in inflation, this difference needs to be explicitly incorporated. The 
paper  particularly  combines  the  above  conventional  model  with  the  model  examined  in 
Harashima (2004) (see Appendix) that explicitly incorporates the preference of a government 
that  pursues  its  political  objectives,  e.g.  strengthening  national  security,  improving  social 
welfare,  or  enhancing  national  prestige.  The  law  of  motion  for  inflation  in  this  model  is 
( )
P G
t θ θ π − = 2 &   in  a  continuous  time  model  and  ( )
P G
t t θ θ π π − + = + 2 1   in  a  discrete  time 
model  where 
G θ and 
P θ are  the  rates  of  time  preference  of  a  government  and  households 
respectively (a microfoundation of the equation is shown in Appendix). Thus the preference of 
government 
G θ is  explicitly  incorporated in  this model.  At  the  equilibrium in  markets  with 
random shocks, an equation  t t
P
t   r   θ r + = + =   holds where  t is i.i.d. shocks with zero mean 
and  0 0 =   . Hence, the law of motion for inflation  ( )
P G
t t θ θ π π − + = + 2 1   can be rewritten as 
( ) t
G
t t   r θ π π − − + = + 2 1   and thus in a discrete time model with random shocks, 
(5)  ( )( ) 1
1
1
0 1 2 1 2 +
+
=





t ξ   t r θ π π , 
where π0 is πt in period 0 and means a steady state inflation rate before a shock on π*, and ξt is 
an i.i.d. shock with zero mean and  0 0 = ξ . The model in the paper includes this equation (5) in 
addition to equations (1), (2), (3) and (4). 
          The inclusion of equation (5) implies that either the target rate of inflation π* or the 
preference of government 
G θ is a time-variable endogenous variable. That is, the model with 
equation (5) considers not only the behavior of monetary policy makers but the behavior of a 
government,  and  the  mechanism  of  inflation  is  explained  by  interactions  between  the 
government and the monetary policy makers. It is a great advantage of the model over other 
models.  Governments  have  been  considered  to play an  important role in inflation  but  most   9 
models do not explicitly consider the behavior of government but only include loss functions of 
monetary policy makers. In those models, the role of government is not explicitly separated 
from the role of monetary policy makers and the relation between them is left ambiguous. As a 
result, interactions between them in the process of inflation are unclear. Conflicts between them 
under the surface of water may result in policy errors but in those models, these errors are solely 
attributed  to  monetary  policy  makers.  Most  explanations  mentioned  in  introduction  need 
unbelievably  insincere  or  foolish  monetary  policy  makers,  but  behind  their  insincerity  or 
foolishness, there seems to be complex interactions between the governments and the monetary 
policy makers. Hence, a more realistic explanation will be possible if the motives of both of 
them  are  considered  separately.  The  model  in  the  paper  explicitly  separates  the  roles  of 
government and monetary policy makers by including equation (5) and analyzes the process of 
decision makings through interactions between them during the Great Inflation. 
 
III. THE CONDITION FOR THE ACCELERATION OF INFLATION 
 
1. The acceleration of inflation in the conventional model   
          Before examining  the  model with equation  (5), the conventional model that does  not 
include  equation  (5)  is  examined  to  more  lucidly  understand  the  nature  of  the  model  with 
equation (5). The conventional model without equation (5) consists of four equations (1), (2), 
(3) and (4). By equations (3) and (4), 















π π − − + + = +1
1 , 
and by equations (1) and (6), 
π
t x |t t z t x t t *
t γ
x γ γ z α x α π r
π π
− − + + +
+ =
+1 . Thereby 








+ − + − − −
−
= .   
By equations (2) and (7),   10 
(8)  ( ) = − + − − − + + + + 1 2 1 1 1 |t t z t
*
π t π z α γ r π γ π γ  
      ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] 1 1 1 1 + + + + − − − + − + − − − t t r |t t z x x |t t z t
*
π t π x η r r β z β γ α z α γ r π γ π γ β . 
Hence   
      + = + t x t π β π 1
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
1
1 1 1 1 1 2 1
−
+ − − − + + − + + − − + + + + + +
π




η r r β z β γ α z α r β z α r γ π γ β
. 
For simplicity, it is assumed that the exogenous variables zt play limited roles for inflation and 
output gaps and thus αz, βz are near zero and approximately  ( ) ( ) 0 1 1 1 2 = − + − + + + + |t t z x x |t t x |t t z z β γ α z β z α . 
Thereby,   
(9)  + = + t x t π β π 1




− − − − − + − − + +
π




η r r β γ α r β r γ π γ β . 
Because  r r t s t = + |   and  0 = +s|t t η   for any s (s = 1,2,3,…) by assumption, then by equation (9),   









s|t t s γ
r γ π γ
π . 
Because  r π γ
* + = , 
(10) 
*
s|t t s π π = + ∞ → lim . 
Equation (10) indicates that, as is well known, the rate of inflation converges at the target rate of 
inflation in conventional models. 
          The  important  implication  of  equation  (10)  is  that  inflation  never  accelerate  for  any 
inflation target π* in case that a conventional model is used. Conversely, equation (10) implies 
that,  to  explain  the  cause  of  the  Great  Inflation  by  a  conventional  model,  an  exceptional 
situation needs to be assumed. It is the reason why any view on the Great Inflation argued in 
introduction assumes an exceptional situation. 
           
2. The acceleration of inflation in the extended model 
          The model with equation (5) is examined. Equation (8) is common to both model with   11 
equation (5) and conventional model without equation (5). By equation (5) and equation (8), 
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π z α γ   r π γ ξ   t r θ π γ  
      ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) 1 1 1
0
0 2 2 1 + + +
=




















π x η   β z β γ α z α γ   r π γ ξ   t r θ π γ β ,   





t ξ   t r θ π π + − − + = ∑
=0
0 2 2   by equation (5). Thereby, 
      ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) [ ]r β t β t γ θ t β t γ x x π
G
x π − + − + − = − + − 1 1 1 2 1 1 2  
      ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) 1 2 1 1
1
1














π x z α   ξ   γ π γ γ π γ β  
      ( ) ( )( ) 1 1 1
0
2 1 + + +
=












− − − ∑ t t r |t t z x x |t t z t t
t
v
v π x η   β z β γ α z α   ξ   γ β ,   
and thus   
      ( ) ( ) [ ]
( )( ) t β t γ







− − − + −
= −
1 1 2
1 1 0  
     
( ) ( )
( )( ) t β t γ
z α   ξ   γ β z α   ξ   γ
x π
|t t z t t
t
v































2 1 2 1 1
0
1 2 1 1
1
1  
      ( )( )
( )( ) t β t γ
η   β z β γ α
x π






1 1 . 
Like the conventional model, it is assumed for simplicity that the exogenous variables zt play 
limited  roles for inflation and  output gaps  and  thus  αz,  βz are  near  zero and  approximately 
( ) ( ) 0 1 1 1 2 = − + − + + + + |t t z x x |t t x |t t z z β γ α z β z α . Thereby 
(11)  ( ) ( ) [ ]
( )( ) t β t γ







− − − + −
= −
1 1 2
1 1 0  
     
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )( ) t β t γ
η   β γ α   ξ   γ β   ξ   γ
x π
t t r x x t t
t
v



































1 .   12 
Because ηt,  t, ξt are i.i.d. shocks with zero mean by assumption, then by taking expectations of 
both sides of equation (11),   
= − r
G θ
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] 0 1
1 1 1 2
1







x − − − +
+ − −
− .
8   
Because  r π γ
* + = ,   
(12)  = − r
G θ









          The important implication of equation (12) is that, because 










β , then 
r
G ≤ θ   if  0 π π
* ≤   and  r
G > θ   if  0 π π
* > .
9  By  equation  (5),  if  r
G ≤ θ   then  inflation 
does not accelerate, but if  r
G > θ   then inflation accelerates. Hence, equation (12) determines 
the rate of inflation in the model instead of equation (10) in the conventional model. Unlike the 
conventional model, the rate of inflation is determined not only by the target rate of inflation π* 
but by the preference of government 
G θ , i.e. by interactions between the government and the 
monetary policy makers. If  0 π π
* = , then 
P G r θ θ = = and inflation neither accelerates nor 
decelerates by equation (5), and therefore, in this case, equation (12) is equal to equation (10) in 
the conventional model such that  0 lim π π π
*
s|t t s = = + ∞ →
. 
          What  should  be  stressed  is  that,  unlike  conventional  models  in  which  there  is  no 
possibility of the acceleration of inflation for any inflation target, there is a possibility that 
inflation accelerates for a range of inflation target, i.e. inflation accelerates if the target rate of 
inflation is above an initial steady state inflation rate π0. This possibility is the most important 
finding in the paper and plays the key role in the explanation for the cause of the Great Inflation 
                                                           
8  Note that either the target rate of inflation π* or the preference of government θ
G is a time-variable 
endogenous variable. For instance, if the target rate of inflation π* is a time-variable endogenous variable, 
π* in equation (11) means π
*
t|0. 
9  Note again that either π* or θ
G is a time-variable endogenous variable.   13 
that does not assume an exceptional situation in the next section. 
          The  key  mechanism  for  accelerating  inflation  lies  in  how  people  perceive 
G θ by 
observing the rule of monetary policy. People can not observe the preference of government 
G θ directly but can observe how monetary policy makers manipulate the short nominal interest 
rate. If people observe that monetary policy makers set an inflation target such that  0 π π
* ≤ , 
people perceive that  r θ
G ≤   and thus inflation will not accelerate by equation (5). On the other 
hand, if people observe that monetary policy makers set an inflation target such that  0 π π
* > , 
people perceive that  r θ
G >   and thus inflation accelerates by equation (5).   
 
IV. THE MECHANISM OF THE GREAT INFLATION 
 
1. The start of the Great Inflation 
          The cause of the Great Inflation is examined by the model with equation (5). Before the 
Great Inflation, i.e. early in the 1960s, the rate of inflation was roughly 0.01 annually. Hence, it 
does not seem unnatural to assume that an initial steady state inflation rate is that  01 . 0 0 = π . 
The target rate of inflation  02 . 0 =
* π   is usually regarded as sufficiently low and natural. If 
monetary policy makers set an inflation target in this way, i.e. set it low but above the prevailing 
low rate of inflation such that  0 01 . 0 02 . 0 π π
* = > = , then people perceive that  r
G > θ   by 
equation (12) and thus inflation accelerates by equation (5). That is, there is a possibility that 
even if a low inflation target is set, inflation accelerates. Even if monetary policy makers believe 
that the target rate of inflation is sufficiently low, there is a possibility that people perceive that 
r
G > θ   and inflation gradually picks up by equation (5). If a government does not actively 
oppose  this  behavior  of monetary  policy  makers,  people  will  perceive  that  the  government 
allows this inflation target and overlooks  r
G > θ . 
          This gradually picking up process is consistent with the observed gradually accelerated   14 
inflation in the 1960s. Hence, it can be argued that the monetary policy makers in the 1960s 
initially made an honest mistake to set the target rate of inflation slightly above the prevailing 
low rate of inflation, because they did not sufficiently understand the acceleration mechanism of 
inflation argued above and thus believed that the target rate of inflation was sufficiently low. In 
addition, the economic theory prevailing at the time seems to have had a great influence on their 
behavior.  Taylor  (2002)  argues  that  the  idea—developed  in  the  1960s—that  there  was  a 
long-run tradeoff between inflation and employment contributed greatly to the Great Inflation. 
Probably this idea tempted the monetary policy makers to set a slightly higher inflation target 
and the government to allow this inflation target.   
 
2. The acceleration of inflation and forced high inflation target rates   
          In addition to the picking up process of the Great Inflation, the model in the paper can 
offer an explanation for the observed high target rate of inflation during the Great Inflation: 
once inflation accelerated owing to the acceleration mechanism of inflation, the target rate of 
inflation π* needs to be raised accordingly by equation (12) unless the preference of government 
G θ is changed downwards sufficiently. If 
G θ   is not changed,  = −r θ
G   a positive constant for 
any period. This means that, unless the target rate of inflation π* is raised gradually as inflation 
rises, equation (12) can not be held. By equation (12), 
        = − r θ
G























= a positive constant.   
Hence, without raising the target rate of inflation π* gradually as time passes, equation (13) and 
thus equation (12) can not be held. That is, unless the preference of government 
G θ is changed 
downwards  sufficiently,  monetary  policy  makers  must  continue  to  raise  the  target  rate  of 
inflation gradually, i.e. the target rate of inflation π* is a time-variable endogenous variable   15 
while the preference of government 
G θ is an exogenous variable in this case, which means that 
the  monetary  policy  makers  are  not  independent  of  the  government  in  this  case.  Many 
researchers  report  that  the  target  rate  of  inflation  in  the  period  of  the  Great  Inflation  was 
significantly high.
10  As was mentioned in introduction, it is hard to explain the reason for this 
unbelievable  action  taken  by  the  monetary  policy  makers  by  the  existing  views  argued  in 
introduction  unless  contending  that  they  deliberately  committed  a  crime  of  high  inflation. 
However, the model in the paper indicates that the monetary policy makers did not willingly set 
the high target rate of inflation but were forced to raise it to hold equation (13) because the 
governments did not change its preference downwards sufficiently.   
 
3. The necessity of drastic policy change to bring down high inflation 
          The explanation, however, is not completed. Another question may be raised: why wasn’t 
the preference of government 
G θ changed downwards sufficiently? As Meltzer (2005) argues, 
the policy makers in the U.S. began anti-inflation policies as early as 1966 and several times 
after—1969, 1973, 1978-79, and 1980. Before answering this question, the way to bring down 
inflation is examined. First, consider a type of monetary policies that the target rate of inflation 















= 0. Hence, this manipulation of inflation target needs to accompany 
government’s gradual downward revisions of its preference 
G θ to the point  r
G = θ . Thereby, 
eventually  r
G = θ   and inflation stabilizes.
11  This type of manipulation— raising the target 
rate of inflation gradually but not enough to hold equation (13) —seems to correspond to the 
                                                           
10  See e.g. Clarida et al. (2000), Favero and Rovelli (2001) and Dennis (2001). 
11  That is, a transition process from the initial steady state inflation rate π0 to the new one π0’—initiated 
by a shock on π*—ends.   16 
“gradualism” that is regarded as the typical behavior of the monetary policy makers at the time. 
However, this type of manipulation has a serious drawback that, during the transition period to 
the point  r
G = θ , the preference of government 
G θ continues to be over  r   and thus inflation 
continues  to  accelerate  and  the  target  rate  of  inflation  must  continue  to  be  raised.  Hence, 
although inflation stabilizes eventually, this stabilized rate of inflation will be very high and stay 
very high forever. 
          To bring down inflation—not to stabilize inflation at high rates, the target rate of inflation 
π* must be reset to satisfy  0 π π
* < . By this action, the sign of the term 









in equation (12) immediately turns negative and thereby  r θ
G < . What should be stressed is 
that, to bring down an already accelerated high inflation, the target rate of inflation π* must be 
lowered  drastically—not  gradually.  Accordingly,  the  nominal  interest  rate  must  be  raised 
drastically by equation (3). It is because an already accelerated high inflation accompanies an 
already highly raised inflation target by equation (13) and thus the target rate of inflation must 
be lowered drastically to achieve  0 π π
* < . To drastically lower the target rate of inflation π*, 
the government simultaneously must drastically lower its preference 
G θ because equation (12) 
can not hold unless 
G θ is drastically lowered. Drastically lowering the target rate of inflation 
will make people perceive that the government and the monetary policy makers coordinated to 
reset  the  preference  of  government 
G θ to  the drastically lower one  that satisfies  r θ
G < .  If 
people successfully turn convincing that  r θ
G < , the rate of inflation will begin to decrease by 
equation (5). As is well-known, the policy of high nominal interest rate was taken in the 1980s 
and  it  successfully  achieved  a  sharp  disinflation.  This  fact  is  perfectly  consistent  with  the 
mechanism explained above and thus this well-known monetary policy change in the late 1970s 
seems to be a typical case of this kind of drastic policy change.
12 
                                                           
12  Once inflation is lowered, in order to keep it low, it is necessary that the target rate of inflation π* is   17 
 
4. A vicious cycle: the hesitation in taking drastic actions and the acceleration of 
inflation 
          The above analysis implies that the question why the preference of government 
G θ was 
not changed downwards sufficiently is equivalent to a question why the governments in the 
1960s and the 1970s took so long time to drastically change policies. An easy answer is that it 
took time for them to fully understand the acceleration mechanism of inflation.
13  However, it 
does not seem likely that they were so foolish that they did not doubt the prevailing economic 
idea throughout the 1970s. Rather, the key to the question seems to lie in the very natures of the 
Great  Inflation  uncovered  in  the  paper,  particularly  the  necessity  of  drastic—not 
gradual—policy change and the acceleration mechanism of inflation.   
          Firstly, even though a government fully recognizes the necessity of drastic policy change, 
the government will be hesitant to this drastic change of policy because drastic policy changes 
usually accompany high risks/uncertainties, both economic and political. In particular, if it is the 
first  experience,  risks/uncertainties  will  be  perceived  much  higher  owing  to  the  lack  of 
information on the outcome of such a drastic change. The governments and the monetary policy 
makers in the 1970s never experienced a peacetime chronic high inflation before and the Great 
Inflation was the first experience for them to be required to change policies drastically to bring 
down inflation. In addition, the idea—although many were increasingly half in doubt in the 
1970s—that  there  was  a  long-run  tradeoff  between  inflation  and  employment  may  have 
exaggerated  the  seriousness  of  the  outcome  of  a  drastic  policy  change  to  some  extent  and 
increased economic and political risks/uncertainties the governments perceived. Probably the 
governments  did  not  expect  the  acceleration  of  inflation  because  initially  they  did  not 
                                                                                                                                                                          
kept to be the one that satisfies  0 π π
* =   and thus that the equation  r θ
G =   is kept. 
13  Taylor (2002) emphasizes the gradual learning process of new economic ideas.     18 
sufficiently understand the acceleration mechanism of inflation, but once inflation accelerated 
unexpectedly by the error explained above, they could not correct the error any longer because 
they were afraid of the risks/uncertainties that the necessary drastic actions would generate. As a 
whole, even if the governments recognized the necessity of drastic policy change to bring down 
the unexpectedly accelerated rate of inflation early in the 1970s, the governments would have 
felt facing significant economic and political risks/uncertainties and would have hesitated to 
take such drastic actions.   
          Secondly, the acceleration mechanism of inflation explained in the paper seems to have 
exaggerated  the  situation.  By  equation  (12),  inflation  continues  to  accelerate  unless  drastic 
actions are taken. If a government hesitates to take drastic actions and instead continues to take 
“gradualism” actions owing to the abovementioned reasons, inflation accelerates by equation 
(12) and the rate of inflation becomes much higher during the hesitation. This higher rate of 
inflation  will  make  the  government  perceive  much  higher  risks/uncertainties  because  much 
more drastic actions are needed. Then the government will continue to hesitate. A vicious cycle 
is generated. It  seems  likely  that  during the  Great Inflation, this kind  of  vicious  cycle  was 
generated  and  the  governments  and  the  monetary  policy  makers  could  not  get  away  from 
“gradualism.” 
          In short, the governments and the monetary policy makers in the 1970s continued to take 
“gradualism”  actions—raising  the  target  rate  of  inflation  gradually  but  not  enough  to  hold 
equation (13)—and needed time to take drastic actions to bring down inflation probably because 
the very natures of the Great Inflation hindered the governments in taking drastic actions, i.e., 
firstly,  the  government  was  made  hesitant  owing  to  the  necessity  of  drastic  actions  that 
accompanied high economic and political risks/uncertainties that were felt higher by the lack of 
experience and by the idea that there was a long-run tradeoff between inflation and employment, 
and secondly, a vicious cycle was generated owing to the acceleration mechanism of inflation. 
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5. The mechanism of the Great Inflation 
          To  sum  up,  the  explanation  for  the  cause  of  the  Great  Inflation  based  on  the  model 
contends that the monetary policy makers in the 1960s and the 1970s did not continue to be 
insincere or foolish and internationally common large or successive negative  supply  shocks 
were irrelevant, but the Great Inflation was a consequence of policy errors that were made in the 
process of interaction between the governments and the monetary policy makers such that (i) 
despite  the  possibility  that  inflation  accelerates  even  for  a  low  inflation  target  by  the 
acceleration mechanism of inflation, the monetary policy makers in the 1960s made an honest 
mistake to set a slightly higher inflation target than the prevailing low rate of inflation because 
initially they lacked the sufficient understanding of the acceleration mechanism and because the 
idea that there was a long-run tradeoff between inflation and employment tempted the monetary 
policy makers to set a slightly higher inflation target and the government to allow this inflation 
target, (ii) after inflation picked up, the monetary policy makers were forced to raise the target 
rate  of  inflation  unwillingly  owing  to  the  acceleration  mechanism  of  inflation,  because  the 
governments  were  made hesitant, and  (iii) the  governments were  hesitant because  a  drastic 
policy change to bring down the unexpectedly accelerated rate of inflation was needed, which 
accompanied high economic and political risks/uncertainties that were exaggerated by the lack 
of  experience  and  by  the  idea  that  there  was  a  long-run  tradeoff  between  inflation  and 
employment. Furthermore, the acceleration mechanism of inflation exaggerated the situation by 
having generated a vicious cycle.   
          The acceleration mechanism of inflation seems to have another effect than it generates a 
vicious cycle. As inflation accelerates by the acceleration mechanism of inflation, more people 
will reach a conclusion that the incumbent government should be replaced because a drastic 
policy change is necessary and the vicious cycle should be severed. When the people who have 
this opinion gain a majority, drastic actions will be taken by a replaced government. Taylor 
(2001, 2002) emphasizes the importance of changes in economic and political leadership as a   20 
cause of the Great Inflation by quoting Milton Friedman. He argues that the Great Inflation was 
fundamentally political, not economic, phenomenon and what ended the Great Inflation was 
Ronald Reagan who accepted a severe recession without bringing pressure on the Fed to reverse 
course.
14  The model in the paper and the explanation for the cause of the Great Inflation by the 




          The  essence  of  this  explanation  lies  in  the  acceleration  mechanism  of  inflation,  i.e. 
equation  (5).  All  the  other  views  argued  in  introduction  assume  implicitly  homogeneity 
r θ θ
P G = =   and thereby inflation does not normally accelerate and will be soon stabilized even 
if it deviated unless assuming an exceptional situation as was shown in equation (10). On the 
other  hand,  the  model  in  the  paper  allows  possibilities  of  heterogeneity  r θ θ
P G = ≠ ,  and 
therefore  the  acceleration  and  deceleration  of  inflation  is  generated  without  assuming  an 
exceptional situation.   
          The above characteristics of the model in the paper seem to be the great advantage of the 
model over other models. In particular, the explanation in the paper has the following appealing 
features. First, it does not need to assume that the monetary policy makers at the time were 
unbelievably insincere or foolish. The time inconsistency view and the policy mistake views 
imply that the monetary policy makers in those days continued to be insincere or foolish for a 
long period of time. However, many will not agree on this conjecture easily.
15  The explanation 
                                                           
14  Meltzer (2005) also emphasizes the large role of political decision making during the Great Inflation 
and concludes that the Federal Reserve was better able to control inflation when the President was named 
Eisenhower or Reagan instead of Johnson, Carter, or Nixon. 
15  Delong (1997) and Taylor (2002) argue that policymakers and academic economists learned about the 
economy only gradually. Meltzer (2005), on the other hand, argues that he does not believe that either the   21 
in the paper also does not stand for these views. Of course, the monetary policy makers should 
be blamed for initially having made an honest mistake to set a slightly higher inflation target 
probably because they lacked the sufficient understanding of the acceleration mechanism and 
because the idea that there was a long-run tradeoff between inflation and employment tempted 
them to set it so. However, the paper argues that the following policy errors were made in the 
process of interaction between the governments and the monetary policy makers. A problem 
was that the governments were made hesitant to take drastic actions because they perceived high 
economic  and  political  risks/uncertainties  that  the  necessary  drastic  policy  change  would 
generate.  In  addition,  the  acceleration  mechanism  of  inflation  exaggerated  the  situation  by 
having generated a vicious cycle. The paper therefore argues that the policy errors made during 
the Great Inflation were not so simple to be attributed solely to the insincerity or foolishness of 
the monetary policy makers. Hence, this explanation seems more natural than explanations that 
merely assume that the monetary policy makers continued to be insincere or foolish for a long 
period of time.   
          Secondly, the view in the paper can explain a mechanism of the observed high target rate 
of inflation.  Setting  a high  inflation target  indicates  that monetary  policy  makers  commit a 
crime of high inflation deliberately. Other views argued in introduction clearly have no other 
way to accept this notion. The paper, however, uncovered a mechanism by which the monetary 
policy makers in those days were forced to raise the target rate of inflation unwillingly owing to 
the  acceleration  mechanism  of  inflation  because  the  governments  were  made  hesitant. 
According to the view, the monetary policy makers did not commit a crime of high inflation 
deliberately but had no other option unless the governments took high risks/uncertainties and 
dared to take necessary drastic actions. This explanation clearly seems more natural than other 
explanations  that  need  to  accept  the  notion  that  the  monetary  policy  makers  deliberately 
                                                                                                                                                                          
start of inflation or the 15 years that followed can be explained fully as a consequence of errors in the 
economic theory that the FOMC applied.     22 
committed a crime of high inflation. 
          Thirdly,  the  explanation  has  an  appealing  feature  such  that  it  is  able  to  explain  the 
international aspect of the Great Inflation without assuming internationally common large or 
successive  negative  real  shocks.  The  shock  based  views,  i.e.  the  bad  luck  view,  the  time 
inconsistency view and the weak response  view, need a common shock across  countries to 
explain the international aspect of the Great Inflation. Some may argue that the oil price shock 
in 1973 was just the shock that was experienced simultaneously in most industrialized countries. 
However, the Great Inflations already started in the mid-1960s in many industrialized countries 
and thus the initial shock can not be attributed to the oil price shock in 1973. Hence, the shock 
based views are facing difficulty to explain the international aspect of the Great Inflation. On 
the other hand, the explanation in the paper does not need such shocks but concerns only the 
attitudes  of  the  government  and  the  monetary  policy  makers.  It  seems  likely  that  the 
governments and the monetary policy makers in those days in most industrialized countries 
assumed a common attitude respectively because the economic policies conducted in the U.S. 
were imitated by other countries. Hence, the view presented in the paper is consistent with the 
international aspect of the Great Inflation, while the shock based views are inconsistent.   
 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
          There are many explanations for the cause of the Great Inflation, and most of them seem 
to be classified into several views: (i) the bad luck view, (ii) the time inconsistency view, (iii) 
the policy mistakes views (the weak response view and the misperception view). These views 
appear very different each other, but they have some common features. First, except the bad 
luck  view,  they  commonly  argue  that  the  monetary  policy  makers  in  the  1960s  and  1970s 
continued  to  be  insincere  or  foolish  for  a  long  period  of  time,  and  secondly,  except  the 
misperception  view,  they  need  exceptionally  large  or  successive  internationally  common   23 
negative real shocks. 
          The paper explored a different possibility of explanation that does not need to assume 
such an exceptional situation. The model in the paper explicitly incorporates the preference of 
government and considers not only the behavior of monetary policy makers but the behavior of 
government. Unlike conventional models, in which  the role of government is not explicitly 
separated  from  the  role  of  monetary  policy  makers  and  the  relation  between  them  is  left 
ambiguous, the model in the paper explicitly separates the roles of them and can analyze the 
process of decision makings through interactions between them. It was shown that the model in 
the paper has a completely different feature from conventional models: inflation accelerates for 
a range of inflation target, while conventional models predict that inflation does not accelerate 
unless an exceptional situation is assumed. This feature is the most important finding in the 
paper and plays the key role in the explanation for the cause of the Great Inflation that does not 
assume an exceptional situation.   
          The paper argues that the Great Inflation was a consequence of policy errors that were 
made in the process of interaction between the governments and the monetary policy makers, 
and the cause of the Great Inflation is explained such that (i) despite the possibility that inflation 
accelerates  even  for  a  low  inflation  target  by  the  acceleration  mechanism  of  inflation,  the 
monetary policy makers in the 1960s made an honest mistake to set a slightly higher target rate 
of inflation than the prevailing low rate of inflation because initially they lacked the sufficient 
understanding of the acceleration mechanism of inflation and because the idea that there was a 
long-run tradeoff between inflation and employment tempted the monetary policy makers to set 
a  slightly higher inflation target and the  government to allow this inflation target, (ii) after 
inflation picked up, the monetary policy makers were forced to raise the target rate of inflation 
unwillingly owing to the acceleration mechanism of inflation, because the governments were 
made hesitant, and (iii) the governments were hesitant because a drastic policy change to bring 
down unexpectedly accelerated inflation was needed, which accompanied high economic and   24 
political risks/uncertainties that were exaggerated by the lack of experience and by the idea that 
there was a long-run tradeoff between inflation and employment. Furthermore, the acceleration 
mechanism of inflation exaggerated the situation by having generated a vicious cycle. 
          The  explanation  in  the  paper  has  three  appealing  features.  First,  it  does  not  need  to 
assume the unbelievable insincerity or foolishness of the monetary policy makers at the time. 
The monetary policy makers should be blamed for initially having made an honest mistake. 
However, the following errors were made in the process of interaction between the governments 
and  the  monetary  policy  makers.  The  paper  argues  that  the  errors  made  during  the  Great 
Inflation  were  not  so  simple  to  be  attributed  solely  to  the  insincerity  or  foolishness  of  the 
monetary policy makers. Secondly, the paper can explain the reason for the observed high target 
rate of inflation. It uncovered a mechanism by which the monetary policy makers at the time 
were forced to raise the target rate of inflation unwillingly because of the hesitation of the 
government to take drastic actions. Hence the explanation does not need to accept the notion 
that the monetary policy makers deliberately committed a crime of high inflation. Thirdly, the 
explanation  can  explain  the  international  aspect  of  the  Great  Inflation  without  assuming 
internationally common large or successive negative real shocks. It concerns only the attitudes 
of the government and the monetary policy makers. The attitudes of them seem to have been 
similar across countries because the economic policies conducted in the U.S. were imitated by 
other countries. 
          Finally, the end of the Great Inflation is explained as follows. As inflation accelerates by 
the acceleration mechanism of inflation, more people will reach a conclusion that the incumbent 
government should be replaced because a drastic policy change is necessary and the vicious 
cycle should be severed. When the people who have this opinion gain a majority, drastic actions 
will be taken by a replaced government. Taylor (2001, 2002) emphasizes by quoting Milton 
Friedman  that  what  ended  the  Great  Inflation  was  Ronald  Reagan  who  accepted  a  severe 
recession without bringing pressure on the Fed to reverse course. The model in the paper and   25 
the explanation for the cause of the Great Inflation by the model is completely consistent with 
this view.  26 
Appendix 
 
A.1. A model of inflation that explicitly incorporates the preference of government 
          Governments  pursue  their  political  objectives,  e.g.  strengthening  national  security, 
improving  social  welfare,  or  enhancing  national  prestige.  The  utility  function  of  such  a 
government is  ( ) t t
G x g u , , where gt is the real government expenditure, xt is the real tax revenue, 






























u . All variables are expressed in per capita terms. 
It is assumed that 
G u is a constant relative risk aversion utility function. The government’s rate 
of time preference is 
G θ . The tax is assumed to be lump-sum. The budget constraint of the 
government is   
t t t t t t S X G R B B − − + = &  
where  Bt  is  the  accumulated nominal  government bonds, Rt is the nominal  interest rate for 
government bonds, and St is the nominal amount of seigniorage in period t. Rt is composed of 
the real interest rate rt and the expected change of bonds’ price by inflation 
e
t b π ,   such that 
e

















=   is the inflation rate in period t. By 
divided by pt, the budget constraint is transformed to   
t t t t t
t
t s x g R b
p
B
− − + =
&
, 
and it is equivalent to   
( ) t t t t t t t t t t t t t t s x g π R b π b s x g R b b − − + − = − − − + = & . 
          Hence, the optimality problem of the government is   






0 0  
subject to     27 
( ) t t t t t t t s x g π R b b − − + − = & . 
          On the other hand, a representative household maximizes the following expected utility: 






0 0  
where 
P u   and 
P θ   are the utility function and the rate of time preference of the representative 
household, subject to the following constraint:   
( ) t t t t g c k f k − − = & , 
where  ( ) • f   is the production function,  t k   is the real capital per capita, and  t c   is the real 
consumption  per  capita.
16  The  constraint  means  that  the  output  ( ) t k f   in  each  period  is 
demanded  for  the  private  consumption  ct,  the  private  investment  t k &   and  the  government 
expenditure gt. The government expenditure gt is an exogenous variable for the representative 
household because the government is a Leviathan.
17  It is assumed that  0 >
′ P u   and  0 <
″ P u  
and the number of population is constant. 
 
A.2. The law of motion for price   
          The  optimality  conditions  of  both  government  and  representative  household  yield  the 
following important and clear-cut results, which are inevitable consequences of heterogeneity 





t b θ θ π π − + = ,   at the steady state such that  0 = t g & ,  0 = t x & ,  0 = t c &   and 
0 = t k & . 
Proof: Let Hamiltonian  H   be 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] t t t t t t t
G
t t
G s x g π R b λ t θ ,x g u H − − + − + − = exp   where  t λ   is  a  costate  variable. 
                                                           
16  The constraint is equivalent to  ( ) ( ) t t t t t t t t t π R b s x b c k f k − + − − − − = & & . 
17  As for the Leviathan government, see, e.g. Brennan and Buchanan (1980).   28 
The optimality conditions of the government’s above problem are   
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exp ,         
(a3)  ( ) t t t t π R λ λ − − = & ,     
(a4)  ( ) t t t t t t t s x g π R b b − − + − = & ,             
(a5)  0 lim =
∞ → t t t b λ .             























































































































&   at  the  steady  state  such  that 
0 = t g &   and  0 = t x & , and thus  t
e
t b t
G π π r θ − + = , . 
          Here, by the optimality conditions of the representative household, 
P
t θ r =   at the steady 
state such that  0 = t c & ,  0 = t k &   and  0 = t g & . 
          Hence t
e
t b




t b θ θ π π − + = ,   at  the  steady  state  such  that 
0 = t g & ,  0 = t x & ,  0 = t c &   and  0 = t k & .     
                                                                                                                                          Q.E.D. 
          This theorem is the natural consequence of simultaneous optimization by a government   29 
and households. What should be stresses is that  t
e
t b π π ≠ ,   if the rates of time preference are 
different between a government and households. It has been naturally conjectured that  t
e
t b π π = ,  
under  rational  expectations,  which  has  been  regarded  as,  so  to  speak,  an  undoubted  law. 
However, theorem 1 indicates that it holds only under a special assumption such that 
P G θ θ = , 
i.e. the homogeneous rate of time preference. Probably because the homogeneous rate of time 
preference  such  that 
P G θ θ =   has  been  regarded  as  naturally  prevailing,  nobody  may  have 
questioned the equation  t
e
t b π π = , . However, the homogeneous rate of time preference is not 
guaranteed usually.
18  If there are heterogeneous rates of time preference between a government 
and households such that 
P G θ θ ≠ , theorem 1 indicates that the equation  t
e
t b π π = ,   can not hold 
anymore.   




t b θ θ π π − + = ,   indicate?  It  indicates  that  inflation 




t b θ θ π π − + = ,   can not hold if 
P G θ θ ≠ . In this more general set-up that allows a situation 
where the rates of time preference are heterogeneous between a government and households, 
inflation accelerates/decelerates as a result of reconciling the contradiction in the rate of time 
preference. To understand this mechanism more clearly, the following additional assumptions 
are introduced. Under theses assumptions that the expected rate of inflation will perfectly realize, 




t b θ θ π π − + = ,   determines  the  path  of  rates  of  inflation, 
disinflation or deflation and thus depicts the basic law of motion for price.   
Assumptions: 
  (A1) The expected change of bonds’ price by inflation 
e
t b π ,   in period t is formed by expected 

















&   where  t E   is  the 
                                                           
18  See Harashima (2004).   30 
expectation operator. 










t v dv π E π dv π .   
 
Assumption (A1) means that the expected change of bonds’ price by inflation 
e
t b π ,   equals the 
expected general price change during period t, and because Rt is based on the budget constraint 
of  the  government  t t t t t t S X G R B B − − + = & ,  assumption  (A1)  is  quite  natural  one. 
Assumption (A2) simply assumes rational expectations. 
Corollary  1: 
G
t t θ π R = −   at  the  steady  state  such  that  0 = t g & ,  0 = t x & ,  0 = t c &   and 
0 = t k & .   
Proof:          By theorem 1 and assumptions (A1) and (A2), 
 
P G








  at the steady state such that  0 = t g & ,  0 = t x & , 
0 = t c &   and  0 = t k & . Hence, 
G
t t θ π R = −   owing to 
P
t θ r =   at the steady state.   
                                                                                                                                          Q.E.D. 
That is, the real interest rate for government bonds estimated using the current inflation rate is 
the time preference rate of the government. 
Lemma  1:  If  and  only  if 
t





− =   at  the  steady  state,  then  the  transversality 
condition (a5)  0 lim =
∞ → t t t b λ   holds.   
Proof:    Substituting the results of theorem 1 and corollary 1 into conditions (a3) and (a4) and 











s x g b λ
t
t t t t t   at the steady state where C
# is a certain constant. 




lim   for the transversality   31 
condition (a5) to be held. 
          Here,  by  condition  (a4), 
t








































  at the 
steady  state then  t b   diminishes to  zero, then the  transversality  condition (a5) can not  hold 






























lim   where C
## is a 
certain constant. Thereby the transversality condition (a5) also can not hold. 
                                                                                                                                          Q.E.D. 
If the transversality condition is satisfied, then, at the steady state, the increase of government’s 
debts  t
Gb θ , i.e. the real interest rate of government bonds estimated using the current inflation 
rate 
G θ   times  accumulated  debts  t b ,  is  equal  to  the  amount  of  reduction  of  debts 
( ) t t t s x g − − −   in any period. 
          Inflation rates will not have seasonal cycles, and therefore the following assumption will 
be seen as quite natural. 
Assumption: (A3)  t π   does not have any cycle of length 1. 
Lemma 2: If and only if  ( )
P G
t ζ t θ θ ζ π π − + = + 2 ,  t π   does not have any cycle of length 1.   
Proof: See Harashima (2004). 
          Hence,  under  assumptions  (A1)  and  (A2),  inflation  rates  develop  according  to  the 
following theorem. 
Theorem 2:  ( )
P G
t θ θ π − = 2 &   at the steady state such that  0 = t g & ,  0 = t x & ,  0 = t c &   and   32 
0 = t k &   if 
t





− =   at the steady state. 




t v θ θ π dv π − = − ∫
+1
  at the steady 




− = +1 . 
          Here, by lemma 2,  ( )
P G
t t θ θ π π − + = + 2 1 . Hence,  ( )
P G
t t
t θ θ π π
dt
dπ
− = − = + 2 1 . 
                                                                                                                                          Q.E.D. 
At first glance, this result may seem incredible, but the equation  ( )
P G
t θ θ π − = 2 &   appears 
quite natural because it indicates that  t π &   = constant, i.e. inflation is significantly persistent, 
which is the essential nature of inflation.   
          Theorem 2 shows the consequence of heterogeneity in preferences between a government 
and households, i.e. inflation plays a crucial role to reconcile the contradiction in the difference 
of time preference rates between a government and households. People are forced to reconcile 
the contradiction in time preference rates by expecting inflation because they know that the 
Leviathan government has no intention to be forced to default in any situation even if its budget 
constraint  may  not  be  satisfied.  Theorem  2  indicates  that  if  there  is  heterogeneity  in  time 
preference rates between a government and households, it will be impossible to construct a 
model of a stable economy without inflation, simply because there will be no other way to 
reconcile the contradiction in the time preference rates than inflation.   33 
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